Implementing the EU renewable target through green certificate markets
Introduction
In December 2008, the EU Parliament agreed on a Climate and Energy Package which is designed to achieve the EU's overall environmental target of a 20 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the renewable target of a 20 % share of renewables in the EU's gross final energy consumption by 2020, see EU (2009a) and EU (2009b) . EU (2009b) is henceforth referred to as the Renewables Directive, whereas the term EU's Energy and Climate Package covers both EU (2009a) and EU (2009b) .
A green certificate system, also known as renewable portfolio standards or renewable obligations, requires consumers, retailers or producers to derive a certain percentage of final energy consumption/production from renewable sources. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the costeffectiveness of various designs of green certificate systems to achieve EU's renewable target. In the light of our findings, we discuss EU's adopted policy of differentiated renewable national targets across Member States. As the GHG reduction target is not our main focus, we assume as a starting point for our analysis that all GHG emissions within the EU are restricted through a uniform price on emission, which ensures that the GHG emission reduction target is met.
According to the literature, if the goal is to secure a certain share of renewables in final consumption, a green certificate market provides a cost effective achievement (Bye, 2003 , Haas et al., 2004 , and Aune et al. 2008 . Green certificates are currently introduced in several European countries (EU, 2008a) .
However, the literature also shows that if the purpose of the regulations is to achieve GHG emission reductions, a green certificate market is not the first best policy, neither alone (Palmer and Burtrow, 2005) or in combination with an emission trading scheme (Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2009, and del Río González, 2007) . 1 Stimulating green energy production can of course be motivated by objectives other than GHG emissions reductions. EU argues that the renewable target means a boost for high-tech industries, new economic opportunities and jobs (EU, 2008b) . It is a well known result that private markets will under-invest in R&D due to firms' inability to appropriate the social returns of investment (Stoneman and Vickers, 1988) . Hence, some kind of governmental funding of R&D may be appropriate to make investors internalize the positive externalities associated with R&D. These objectives could 1 For other studies on the performance of green certificates see, e.g. Amundsen and Nese (2009) , Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) , Morthorst (2001) , Fischer (2006) and Bertoldi and Huld (2006) . nevertheless be met more cost effectively by R&D subsidies than by setting a fixed renewable target.
As pointed out in Sorrell and Sijm (2003) , the objectives must be explicit in order to design efficient policies. In this paper, we do not question whether a renewable target is a part of an efficient policy or the motivations for stimulating green energy production. 2 We simply take the renewable target as a premise for our study.
To achieve the target of a 20 % share of renewables in EU's total energy consumption, the European
Council has adopted mandatory differentiated national targets for each of the Member States. The national targets range from 10 % to 49 %, but are consistent with EU's overall renewable target.
According to the Renewable Energy Directive (EU, 2009b, article 5), the consumption of renewables is defined as electricity and heat produced from renewable sources, plus the consumption of other renewable energy sources, such as biofuels. Hence, the renewable target can be interpreted as a target for green energy production + net import of green energy, relative to final energy consumption.
EU's climate and energy package sets no restrictions on how countries may stimulate their green energy production. Currently, there is a wide range of policy instruments aimed at promoting renewable energy in use in the EU countries (Haas et al., 2004 and EU, 2008a) . As a point of departure for our analysis, we consider a situation where the policy instrument to achieve the renewable target is a green certificate system in all countries. However, it is worth noticing that the market solution following from the green certificate system can be mimicked through a subsidy on green energy production and a tax on energy consumption under the restriction of budget neutrality (Aune et al., 2008, chapter 6 .2).
The Renewables Directive states that the Member States may meet their national renewable targets by financing green energy production in other countries, so-called statistical transfers. 3 The option for statistical transfers is a means to reduce the total cost of meeting the renewable target by distributing green energy production across Member States more cost effectively, compared to a situation where each country has to meet its target by domestic renewable energy production. It is, however, yet unclear to which extent this option will be utilized by the Member States. According to EU (2010), only 5 EU countries will rely on non-domestic measures to meet their targets, and less than 1 per cent 2 Although a properly designed green certificates system leads to cost-effectiveness when the policy goal is to increase the share of renewables, it is not an efficient instrument for correcting for externalities (see Aune et al., 2008, chapter 6.2) . 3 See article 6 of EU (2009b).
of the renewable production will be traded between member countries or between EU countries and third party countries.
A potential system that fully exploits the benefit from a cost effective distribution of renewable energy production is an EU-wide green certificate system: All producers receive a green certificate for every unit green energy produced, and all consumers of energy must purchase green certificates corresponding to the specified share of renewable energy faced by their countries of origin. 4 The EU's system of statistical transfers can be seen as a first step towards a full green certificate system in the 
The Theoretical Model
To analyse the scenarios theoretically it is sufficient to consider a two country case. We also simplify the analysis by ignoring trade in energy with third countries (the numerical model provides a more realistic presentation of the energy market in the EU, including trade with countries outside the EU).
Let e 1 and e 2 denote the consumption of energy from the two countries, 1 and 2. Let i x and i y denote country i's production of renewable (green) and fossil (brown) energy, respectively. For the consumers, we assume that both types of energy are perfect substitutes. Furthermore, let i i c (x ) and i i f (y ) be country i's cost functions for producing green and brown energy, respectively, whereas i i B (e ) denotes country i's benefit of consuming energy. We assume free trade, no transportation costs, and the following properties of the cost and benefit functions:
c (x ) 0, c (x ) 0, f (y ) 0, f (y ) 0, B (e ) 0, and B (e ) 0. e e x x y y      .
As a starting point we consider a situation where the two countries jointly have a target for emissions of CO 2 from the combustion of fossil fuels. As we only consider one type of fossil fuels in this theoretical part of the paper, this corresponds to a target ( Y ) for total consumption of fossil fuels:
The countries have a common target for the share (α) of renewable green energy in their final consumption:
Throughout this theoretical analysis we only consider situations where both constraints are binding.
Hence, (2) and (3) are satisfied with equality.
Total welfare (W) is given by:
Maximizing
(4) w.r.t. e i , x i and y i subject to (1), (2) and (3), yields the following optimality conditions:
where 1  is the shadow cost of the market equilibrium constraint (1), 2  is the shadow cost of the fossil fuel target constraint, (2), and 3  is the shadow cost of the renewable target constraint, (3). Let
e ,x , y , , and    denote the outcome of the optimal solution following from (1), (2), (3) and
We see from (5) that the marginal cost of producing green energy must exceed both the marginal benefit of consuming energy and the marginal cost of producing fossil fuels in optimum (as 3  and 2  > 0, and 0 1    by assumption). Furthermore, we see that the marginal benefit of consumption is equalized across consumers, the marginal cost of green energy production is equalized across green energy producers, and finally, the marginal cost of fossil fuel production is equalized across fossil fuel producers.
In the next sections we consider three different scenarios for achieving the renewable target by the use of a green certificate system, given a common competitive energy market and a common competitive tradable emissions permits market. The scenarios correspond to i) -iii), described in the introduction.
Scenario i): Common target -Common certificate market
The countries have a common target for the share (α) of renewable energy in their final consumption.
This implies that all consumers of energy are obliged to purchase α green certificates for each unit of energy they consume. Let β denote the unit price on certificates. Renewable energy producers have the right to sell one green certificate per unit renewable energy produced. Let p denote the market price on energy. Let t denote the market price on emission permits, and let p denote the consumer price on energy. The net benefit from consumption (w) in country i is:
As we have assumed that both types of energy are perfect substitutes for the consumers, the consumer price cannot differ across energy types.
The producer price on each energy source equals the market price less of any net taxes (taxes minus subsidies). The producers of renewable energy also gain β on each unit of energy. Hence, the green and brown energy producers' profit functions, denoted ix  and iy  , are respectively:
The producer price on energy for fossil fuel producers equals p-t, whereas the producer price on green energy equals p+ β.
The first order conditions for consumers' welfare optimization and producers' profit maximization are found by maximising (6) w.r.t. e i , maximizing (7) w.r.t. to x i , and maximizing (8) w.r.t. to y i :
e (p ),x (p ) and y (p t)      denote the demand and supply functions following from (9).
The renewable target constraint, (3), sets the market equilibrium condition for the certificate market:
By inserting the demand and supply functions following from (9) into (1) and (2)  ensure that the constraints regarding total consumption and production (eq. (1)- (3)) are satisfied. Furthermore, we see from (9) that a common green certificate market also ensures the optimal distribution of production and consumption across countries. Thus, it follows from (9) that
Hence, the green energy certificate market ensures the optimal solution, given a target for the share of green energy in final energy consumption (eq. (3)).
Scenario ii): Differentiated targets -A common certificate market
In this situation, each country has an individual target for its share of renewable energy in final consumption, α i . There is a common green certificate market. This implies that the producer price on green energy equals p   in both countries, as in scenario i), whereas the consumer prices on energy (6), the first order conditions for consumers' welfare maximization and producers' profit maximization are given by: However, the production of green energy is cost effectively distributed across producers.
When the green certificates are tradable across countries, all green energy producers face the same producer price and a cost effective distribution of green energy production is ensured. Differentiated targets lead to differentiated consumer price on energy across consumers and the consumption of energy is thus not distributed optimally across consumers.
Scenario iii): Differentiated targets -National certificate markets
In this situation, each country has an individual target for its share of renewable energy in final consumption α i , and each country has an individual certificate market. Consider a group of countries with a target for a specific share of total renewable energy in overall energy consumption. Individual green certificate markets lead to an inefficient distribution of green energy production and an inefficient distribution of energy consumption.
Numerical illustrations
In order to evaluate the qualitative impact of the alternative scenarios, we need an energy market model that captures the main features of the different alternatives, and quantify the impact on main economic variables, such as total cost, consumer surplus, producer surplus, energy production and prices. To conduct this qualitative evaluation, we use the multi-market energy equilibrium model LIBEMOD. The model's focus is on the electricity and natural gas markets of Western Europe, but it also covers global markets for coal and oil. See Golombek et al. (2009) As the EU's Energy and Climate Package covers all of the current 27 EU members, (EU-27), whereas LIBEMOD only reports CO 2 emissions and green energy production from the Western European countries, LIBEMOD has a limitation when it comes to simulating the full effects of EU's policy.
However, we believe that LIBEMOD-simulations still provide a good picture of the impact of the various designs of green certificate markets in the EU, as LIBEMOD's endogenous model countries cover 85 % and 84 % of EU-27's energy consumption and production, respectively (Eurostat, 2008) . 9 6 The version of LIBEMOD used in the present paper -LIBEMOD 2000 CCS -differs somewhat from the one documented in Aune et al. (2008) , the main differences being i) electricity is traded in two (not six) periods over the 24-hour cycle, ii) more electricity technologies are available (CCS technologies for coal and gas power plants), and iii) a more aggregated representation of coal markets is used. As the Renewables Directive is the main focus of this paper, we have simplified the GHG emissions policy by assuming that all sources of emissions face the same price on emission, in terms of a common CO 2 tax, and this tax ensures that the target is fulfilled. Furthermore, we only consider emissions of CO 2 , and assume that the percentage G HG reduction targets holds for CO 2 -emissions.
All markets in LIBEMOD are competitive. In each endogenous model country there is investment in energy infrastructure, as well as production, consumption and trade of energy. In equilibrium all arbitrage possibilities are exploited and thus price differences for each good reflect cost differences only.
Seven energy goods are included; electricity, biomass, oil, natural gas, lignite, steam coal and coking coal. Natural gas and electricity are traded between endogenous model countries as well as a few exogenous model countries such as Russia. Oil, steam coal and coking coal are traded in global markets. However, the biomass used as input factor in the production of electricity is endogenously determined in the model.
Simulations
Using the LIBEMOD model, we compare the costs of implementing EU's renewable target through the three different scenarios described in the theoretical model: i) an equal percentage renewable target for all countries and EU-wide trade in green certificates system, ii) individual renewable targets and EU-wide trade in green certificates and iii) individual renewable targets and no EU-wide trade in green certificates.
As a starting point for our analysis, we first simulate a base scenario with no renewable target, but with a common EU-wide carbon tax sufficiently high to ensure a 20 % reduction of emissions of carbon dioxide in 2020. Thereafter, we simulate the three different scenarios for green certificates systems, given both the target for CO 2 emissions and the renewable target. Table 1 presents the impact of introducing a renewable target through the three different scenarios for green certificates. The absolute numbers represent the changes relative to the case with no renewable target (base scenario), whereas the percentage numbers in the brackets represents the percentage change in outcome of scenario i) and ii) relative to scenario iii). Hence, the percentage numbers show the effects of opening up for trade in green certificates, given a renewable target.
From Table 1 we see that opening up for EU-wide trade in green certificates strongly reduces the cost of introducing a renewable target compared to domestic certificate trade only. The cost of meeting the overall EU target is reduced by 69 % under system ii) compared to system iii). The cost effective solution with a common renewable target and EU-wide trade in certificates (system i) reduces the costs by 71 % compared to system iii). This tells us that the main driving force to reduce the cost of the renewable target is to allow for trade in green certificates. 14 Given free trade in green certificates, shifting from differentiated national targets to common national targets only reduces the costs further by approximately 4 %.
From Table 1 , we also see that the introduction of the Renewables Directive causes large changes in the producer and consumer surplus. 15 The large increase in the producer surplus is mainly caused by increased incomes from green certificates. The producers of renewable energy receive an income from the green certificate system and therefore increase their producer surplus. We see that the producer surplus is very similar under system i) and ii), but is much higher under system iii). This is mainly driven by the higher prices on green certificates under scenario iii). The average price of green certificates equals € 47 in scenario iii), whereas the common certificate price has fallen to € 26 in scenario i) and iii), due to the EU-wide trade in green certificates.
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14 Our estimated gains from trade in certificates are somewhat higher than the estimate in EU (2008a), where the costs from achieving the renewable and greenhouse gas target are based on simulations using the PRIMES and GAINS models. They find that trade in green certificates, given differentiated renewable targets, can reduce costs by € 8 Bn compared with no trade in certificates. See table 36 in EU (2008a). Their results are not directly comparable with ours due to different countries being included in the analysis and different assumptions about the carbon costs in the non EU ETS sector. 15 Consumer surplus is here understood as the surplus for all end-users of energy (households, the service industries, other industries and transportation). 16 One certificate being equal to one MWh of renewable energy production.
The consumer surplus is substantially reduced in all three scenarios. Introducing a renewable target is costly for the consumers as they have to pay for green certificates in order to be able to consume energy. However, Table 1 shows that the loss in consumer surplus is considerably lower when the green certificates are tradable EU-wide. Again, this follows from a lower certificate price with EUwide tradable green certificate systems compared to national green certificate systems.
In all three systems there is also a clear decrease in tax income. Taxes included in the model are energy taxes, VAT and carbon taxes. The renewable target leads to lower energy consumption in general and especially lower consumption of fossil energy. Hence, revenues from energy taxation are reduced due to a lower tax base. Furthermore, the renewable target increases the cost of consuming fossil energy. The level of the carbon tax necessary to achieve the target for CO 2 emissions is therefore lower in a situation with a renewable target compared to a situation without. In our model simulation, the carbon tax sufficient to achieve the 20 % reduction in carbon emissions target falls from € 59 to € 52 per tonne CO 2 when the renewable target is introduced. As green certificate schemes are revenue neutral, there is no "green tax" income to compensate for the loss in energy-and carbon tax revenues.
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From Table 1 we see that the choice of scenario for green certificate markets also affects total gross consumption of energy. By the introduction of the renewable target through scenario iii), the final gross consumption of renewable energy is reduced by 60 Mtoe, which corresponds to a reduction of 4 percent relative to the base scenario. With EU-wide trade in green certificate, the reduction in gross final consumption is 50 % less. Hence, as all scenarios must fulfill the renewable target, the amount of renewable energy consumption is larger under EU-wide certificate trade than under domestic certificate trade only.
Average producer price of electricity, weighted by each countries production share, is reduced with between € 2 and € 3 per MWh, equivalent to a reduction between 4 and 4.5 % in all three scenarios.
The green certificate market can be viewed as a subsidy to green energy production and a tax on energy consumption. Both green energy production subsidies and taxes on consumption reduce producer prices (exclusive the certificate price) and the results are thus in accordance with theory.
17 Note that our simulation does not take into account how the loss of CO 2 tax revenues must be compensated by an increase in other producer or consumer taxes, or reduced governmental spending.
The effect on the end-user electricity price (electricity price plus certificate price) by introducing the green certificate market is not given from theory (see e.g. Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001 , Bye, 2003 and Fischer, 2006 . Depending on the slope of the nonrenewable energy supply curve relative to the renewable energy supply curve, the combination of a tax and a subsidy might lead to both increasing and decreasing end-user electricity prices. In our numerical model, the average end-user price on electricity, weighted by consumption, increases as a result of the renewable target being implemented.
The increase is more than twice as large with national targets and no trade in green certificates as with trade in certificates. If it turns out that the CCS technology will be too costly to implement or that it is not an accepted abatement technology due to the uncertainties related to safe storage of CO 2 , the cost of reaching a 20 % reduction in carbon emissions increases substantially. Due to the corresponding high carbon prices, renewable energy become more profitable and there is no added cost by implementing the renewable target as long as there is EU-wide trade in green certificates (the certificate price is zero).
Without trade in certificates the total cost of reaching the renewable target is € 4225 million, i.e. the added cost of the renewable target is substantially lower than with CCS.
Results by country
The costs of the different ways of implementing the renewable target differ substantially between countries. In Figure 1 we see the cost reduction across countries from having EU-wide trade in green certificates. Cost in scenario i) and ii) are compared to the situation under scenario iii).
In scenario ii) and iii), the differentiated national renewable targets are identical, but scenario ii) allows for EU-wide certificate trade, whereas scenario iii) does not. Access to an EU-wide market is in itself beneficial for all countries. It is particularly beneficial for countries that become large traders in the certificate market. However, EU-wide trade in green certificates affects the equilibrium prices on all energy sources. Due to these terms of trade effects, some countries are worse off in scenario ii) compared to scenario iii).
Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden will benefit most from a shift from scenario iii) to scenario ii).
We see from Figure 2 that Italy has a high national price on green certificates in scenario iii). The high price is a reflection of high domestic costs of green energy production. Hence, the cost of meeting their renewable target is substantially reduced when they get access to green certificates at a much lower price in scenario ii). For Finland, Norway and Sweden, the gains from an EU-wide market for certificates follow from their capacity to produce green energy at low costs. We see from Figure 2 , that their price on green certificates is zero under scenario iii), even though they have national targets way above the average (see appendix A). This indicates that these countries will become large sellers of certificates in scenario ii) and exploit the gains from trade.
Whether a country is better off in scenario ii) than in scenario i) depends mainly on whether its national target in scenario ii) is above or below the common target in scenario i). Sweden and Norway have the highest national targets, set at 40 % and 68 %, respectively, in our model. Surely, they will both benefit substantially by a replacement of their national targets with the common targets of 19.7 % in scenario i). A u s t r i a B e l g i u m S w i t z e r l a n d G e r m a n y D e n m a r k S p a i n F i n l a n d F r a n c e G r e a t B r i t a i n G r e e c e I r e l a n d I t a ly T h e N e t h e r l a n d s N o r w a y P o r t u g a l S w e d e n System iii) System i) and ii)
Concluding remarks
The EU has agreed on differentiated renewable targets across Member States to achieve the renewable target of a 20 % share of renewables in the EU's total final energy consumption by 2020. We have shown that differentiated national targets do not lead to a cost effective implementation of EU's renewable target (see proposition 1 and 2). However, an important result from our numerical model is that, given differentiated national targets, the overall cost of achieving the EU's renewable target can be cut by almost 70 per cent if the Member States are allowed to trade green certificates. The
Renewable Energy Directive (EU, 2009b) allows for so called statistical transfers, which means that
Member States may meet their national renewable targets by financing green energy production in other countries. Our paper shows the great potential for cost savings by developing this system into a well functioning green certificate market. Our numerical model also shows that the various designs of green certificate markets have great influence on the distribution of costs across countries. Hence, allowing for trade in green certificates (or statistical transfers) alters the distribution of costs across countries. If the EU also has a target for distribution of costs across countries, a development of a green certificate market may also necessitate a redistribution of the differentiated renewable targets across countries, if financial transfers/compensations are excluded. But then again, a redistribution of national targets affects the efficiency loss following from the corresponding differentiated consumer prices on energy. This is the well known result that distributional concerns must (in general) be separated from efficiency concerns when designing cost effective policy instruments.
